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Coding for Positive Rate in the Source Model Key Agreement Problem
Amin Gohari, Onur Gu¨nlu¨, and Gerhard Kramer
Abstract
The two-party key agreement problem with public discussion, known as the source model problem,
is considered. By relating the key agreement problem to hypothesis testing, a new coding scheme
is developed that yields a sufficient condition to achieve a positive secret-key (SK) rate in terms of
Chernoff information. The merits of this coding scheme are illustrated by applying it to an erasure
model for Eve’s side information, for which the Chernoff information gives an upper bound on the
maximum erasure probability for which the SK capacity is zero. This bound is shown to strictly
improve over the one given by the best known single-letter lower bound on the SK capacity. Moreover,
the bound is shown to be tight when Alice’s or Bob’s source is binary, which extends a previous result
for a doubly symmetric binary source. The results motivate a new measure for the correlation between
two random variables, which is of independent interest.1
1 Introduction
The source model problem for key agreement considers two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, and an eaves-
dropper, Eve [1, 2]. Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively, observe n independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) repetitions of random variables X, Y , and Z that are distributed according to the probability
mass function (pmf) pXY Z(x, y, z) for x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, where X , Y, and Z are finite sets. The pmf
pXY Z is called the source pmf, or simply the source. Alice and Bob engage in an authenticated and public
discussion to agree on a key secret from Eve as follows (see [3, Section 22.3] for a review of the problem).
Alice first creates a public message F1 using some pF1|Xn(f1|x
n) and sends it to Bob. Bob generates a
public message F2 using some pF2|Y nF1(f2|y
n, f1) and sends it to Alice, then Alice generates F3 according
to some pF3|XnF1:2(f3|x
n, f1:2), etc. After k rounds of communication, Alice creates a key KA according
to some pKA|XnF1:k(kA|x
n, f1:k) and Bob creates a key KB according to some pKB|Y nF1:k(kB |y
n, f1:k). In
an (n, δ) code, we require the keys to be equal with high probability such that
P(KA = KB) ≥ 1− δ. (1)
We require the keys to have large entropy, a condition that we express as
1
n
H(KA) ≥
1
n
log |K| − δ (2)
where H(·) is the entropy function and K is the alphabet of KA and KB. We also require the keys to be
almost independent of Eve’s information
1
n
I(KA;Z
nF1:k) ≤ δ (3)
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where I(·; ·) is the mutual information.
The key rate is R = 1nH(KA). A key rate R is said to be achievable if, given any δ > 0, there is an
(n, δ) code satisfying (1)-(3). The supremum of all achievable key rates is called the source model secret-
key (SK) capacity and denoted by S(X;Y ‖Z). Extensions to multiple parties and continuous random
variables can be found in [4–9].
In this paper we are interested in the feasibility of key generation at a positive rate, i.e., S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0.
Note that if key generation is feasible, it should be feasible also when Alice and Bob do not have access
to private randomness. Thus, we may assume that the interactive communication F satisfies
H(F1|X
n) = H(F2|F1Y
n) = H(F3|F1:2X
n) = · · · = 0. (4)
The idea is that Alice and Bob can use an initial part of their observations to distill private randomness
and the remaining parts to extract a key.
1.1 Overview of the Main Results
We provide a condition for the feasibility of SK generation at a positive rate for a general probability
distribution on X,Y,Z in terms of the Chernoff information. The condition is based on a new constructive
approach for achieving a positive SK rate that extends ideas in [2,10,11]. The extension is motivated by
using hypothesis testing for SK agreement. Hypothesis testing was previously used for infeasibility results
in network information theory, e.g., meta converses [12,13].
On the one hand, our coding scheme falls in the general class of advantage distillation protocols (e.g.
see [2, Section V]). Roughly speaking, advantage distillation protocols provide an information-theoretic
advantage to Alice and Bob over Eve as follows: Alice and Bob select a subset of realizations of their
random variables for which they have an advantage over Eve. Utilizing public discussion, Alice and Bob
agree on these realizations. More information about advantage distillation protocols and their variants
can be found in [14–16].
On the other hand, the particular code can be understood in terms of a hypothesis testing problem
as follows. After initial public discussion, Alice sets up a hypothesis testing problem that Bob solves to
find an estimate of Alice’s secret key. More specifically, suppose that Alice produces a binary random
variable K ∈ {0, 1} using her private randomness (independent of her observation Xn). Alice splits Xn
into two blocks of size n2 : X1:n2 and X
n
2
+1:n. If K = 0, Alice puts the sequence (X1:n
2
,Xn
2
+1:n) = X
n
on the public channel. If K = 1, Alice swaps the two blocks and puts (Xn
2
+1:n,X1:n
2
) on the public
channel. Then, the task of Bob (and Eve) is to use their observation Y n (and Zn) to decide which
of the two hypotheses, i.e., K = 0 or K = 1, is true. If Bob’s error exponent in finding K is better
than Eve’s error exponent, Alice and Bob can use privacy amplification to obtain a shared secret key.
An initial interactive public discussion can improve this protocol. For instance, if Yi = Yn
2
+i for some
1 ≤ i ≤ n/2 − 1, then the values of Yi and Yn
2
+i do not help Bob to choose between K = 0 and K = 1.
Thus, at the beginning of the protocol, Bob can publicly reveal the set of indices i such that Yi = Yn
2
+i.
Observations Xi, Yi,Xn
2
+i, Yn
2
+i may be then removed by Alice and Bob from their sequences X
n and Y n
before running the above protocol.
Our constructive approach for achieving a positive SK rate is based on a similar sequence swapping
construction. We illustrate the merits of this construction for the class of joint probability distributions
pXY Z(x, y, z) = pXY (x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y) where pZ|XY (z|x, y) is an erasure channel, i.e., Z = XY with
2
probability 1 − ǫ and Z = e with probability ǫ, where e is the erasure symbol (the alphabet of Z
is Z = {e} ∪ (X × Y)). Such sources are called erasure sources with erasure probability ǫ. Observe
that an erasure source is characterized by the joint probability distribution pXY (x, y) and the erasure
probability ǫ. When ǫ = 0, we have Z = XY and S(X;Y ‖Z) = 0. When ǫ = 1, we have Z = e and
S(X;Y ‖Z) = I(X;Y ). Our approach provides a sufficient condition on ǫ such that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0. We
also prove the necessity of this condition when X or Y is binary. As a result, our advantage distillation
code is optimal and yields the exact characterization of the set of ǫ ∈ [0, 1] such that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0
when X or Y is binary.
For example, consider the doubly symmetric binary-erasure (DSBE) source, where (X,Y ) is a doubly
symmetric binary source (DSBS) with parameter p, i.e., we have pXY (0, 0) = pXY (1, 1) = (1 − p)/2
and pXY (0, 1) = pXY (1, 0) = p/2 (see [11, Scenario 2 and Fig. 6(a)]). We present a simple example
where our code outperforms the code given in [17] that uses random binning and multiple auxiliary
random variables to capture multiple rounds of communication. Our achievability result shows that the
SK capacity vanishes if and only if
ǫ ≤
min{p, 1− p}
max{p, 1− p}
(5)
which recovers the result in [11, Theorem 14] that uses a repetition code protocol from [2] for advantage
distillation. However, we show more, namely that our code (and the repetition code protocol of [2])
outperforms the best known single-letter lower bound given in [17, Theorem 7]. We show that this bound
vanishes if and only if
ǫ ≤ 4p(1 − p). (6)
Since 4p(1− p) > min{p,1−p}max{p,1−p} when p 6= 1/2, the lower bound is loose for a DSBE source for any p 6= 1/2.
This result suggests that multi-letter constructions may be necessary for optimal SK agreement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our notation and give
definitions. We also review the best known bounds for the SK agreement problem, and a characterization
of when the SK capacity is positive. Our main results are given in Section 3 and proved in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Definitions
Random variables are written as uppercase letters while their realizations are written as lowercase letters.
Caligraphic letters denote sets. We write U1:i−1 for (U1, U2, . . . , Ui−1). The function h(p) = −p log p −
(1−p) log(1−p) is the binary entropy function. We use F to denote the public discussion (F1, F2, . . . , Fk).
Definition 1. The Renyi divergence of order α between two pmfs pX(x) and qX(x) is
Dα(pX(x)‖qX (x)) =
1
α− 1
log
(∑
x
pX(x)
αqX(x)
1−α
)
.
The Chernoff information between two pmfs pX(x) and qX(x) is
C(pX(x)‖qX(x)) = max
α∈[0,1]
(1− α)Dα(pX(x)‖qX(x)).
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Observe that
C(pX(x)‖qX(x)) = − log
(
min
α∈[0,1]
∑
x
pX(x)
αqX(x)
1−α
)
≤ − log
(∑
x
min(pX(x), qX(x))
)
= − log (1− ‖pX(x)− qX(x)‖TV ) (7)
where ‖pX(x) − qX(x)‖TV =
1
2
∑
x |pX(x) − qX(x)| is the total variation (TV) distance between pX and
qX .
Definition 2. [18, p. 350] [19, p. 929] Given a joint pmf pXY (x, y), the strong data processing constant
is
s∗(X;Y ) = sup
pU|X(u|x)
I(U ;Y )
I(U ;X)
where U is an auxiliary random variable such that U → X → Y forms a Markov chain. It suffices to
consider |U| ≤ |X |+ 2 where U and X are the respective alphabets of U and X.
Definition 3. [19, p. 928] The maximal correlation coefficient ρm(pXY (x, y)) is defined as the maximum
of Pearson’s correlation coefficients over all non-constant functions f(·) and g(·), respectively, of X and
Y , i.e.,
ρm(pXY (x, y)) = max
f(·),g(·)
E
[
(f(X)− E[f(X)])(g(Y )− E[g(Y )])
]√
Var[f(X)]Var[g(Y )]
(8)
where E[·] and Var[·] denote the expectation and variance operations, respectively.
Definition 4. Given a channel p(y|x), define
η(pY |X(y|x)) = max
pX(x)
s∗(X;Y )
(a)
= max
pX(x)
ρ2m(pXY (x, y)) (9)
where (a) follows from [19, Theorem 8].
Definition 5. [20, 21] Given two pmfs pXY (x, y) and qXY (x, y) on the alphabets X × Y, the relation
qXY (x, y)  pXY (x, y) represents existence of some functions a : X → R+ ∪ {0} and b : Y → R+ ∪ {0}
such that
qXY (x, y) = a(x)b(y)pXY (x, y) for ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y. (10)
Example 1. Let X1 = {x ∈ X : pX(x) > 0} and X2 = {x ∈ X : qX(x) > 0}. If X2 ⊆ X1 and
qY |X(y|x) = pY |X(y|x), then qXY (x, y)  pXY (x, y). To show this result, choose a(x) = qX(x)/pX(x) for
x ∈ X1 and a(x) = 0 for x /∈ X1. Also, let b(y) = 1 for all y ∈ Y.
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2.2 SK Capacity Lower Bound
The authors of [1] compute the SK capacity when messages are allowed to be transmitted in only one
direction over the public channel. The one-way communication capacity from X to Y is given by
Sow(X;Y ‖Z) = max
V→U→X→Y Z
I(U ;Y |V )− I(U ;Z|V ). (11)
It suffices to consider |V| ≤ |X | and |U| ≤ |X | where V, U , X are the alphabets of V,U,X, respectively [3, p.
561]. Clearly, Sow(X;Y ‖Z) is a lower bound on the SK capacity S(X;Y ‖Z).
The best known single-letter lower bound on the SK capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) uses interactive communi-
cation [17, Theorem 7]. Given random variables U1, U2, · · · , Uk satisfying the Markov chain conditions
Ui → XU1:i−1 → Y Z for odd i (12)
Ui → Y U1:i−1 → XZ for even i (13)
and for any integer ζ such that 1 ≤ ζ ≤ k, we have S(X;Y ‖Z) ≥ L(X;Y ‖Z) where
L(X;Y ‖Z) =
[ ∑
i≥ζ
odd i
I(Ui;Y |U1:i−1)− I(Ui;Z|U1:i−1)
]
+
[ ∑
i≥ζ
even i
I(Ui;X|U1:i−1)−I(Ui;Z|U1:i−1)
]
. (14)
Using standard reduction techniques, we can restrict the cardinality |Ui| of Ui to
|Ui| ≤


|X |
i−1∏
l=1
|Ul| for i odd,
|Y|
i−1∏
l=1
|Ul| for i even.
(15)
Let L¯(X;Y ‖Z) be the best possible lower bound obtained from (14). This bound is difficult to evaluate
since ζ and k are arbitrary and the cardinality bounds on the sizes of U1, U2, . . . , Uk grow exponentially.
However, one can simplify the calculations by using the ideas from [20–22], where auxiliary random
variables are represented by upper concave envelopes.
2.3 SK Capacity Upper Bounds
An early upper bound on S(X;Y ‖Z) is min{I(X;Y ), I(X;Y |Z)} [2]. This was later improved with the
intrinsic mutual information upper bound [1, pp. 1126, Remark 2], [11]:
S(X;Y ‖Z) ≤ B0(X;Y ‖Z) , min
pJ|Z(j|z)
I(X;Y |J). (16)
The idea is that if we make Eve weaker by passing Z through a channel pJ |Z(j|z), then the SK capacity
cannot decrease. Thus, we have
S(X;Y ‖Z) ≤ S(X;Y ‖J) ≤ I(X;Y |J)
where XY → Z → J forms a Markov chain. Considering J = ∅ and J = Z, we recover the earlier upper
bound min{I(X;Y ), I(X;Y |Z)} on S(X;Y ‖Z). In evaluating B0(X;Y ‖Z), it suffices to restrict J to
have cardinality size of at most |Z| [23].
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Other upper bounds are given in [17,24–26]. The best known upper bound is [17]
B1(X;Y ‖Z) = inf
pJ|XYZ
[
I(X;Y |J) + max
V→U→XY→ZJ
I(U ;J |V )− I(U ;Z|V )
]
. (17)
See [27] for a discussion on the computability of this bound. The interpretation of B1(X;Y ‖Z) given
in [17] is based on the idea of splitting the secret key into two parts so that only one part is independent
of J . We give a new interpretation of B1(X;Y ‖Z) in Appendix A.
2.4 Conditions for a Positive SK Capacity
In an early work, Maurer gives an example where multiple rounds of communication are necessary to
achieve a positive SK capacity [2, Section V]. Orlitsky and Wigderson show in [10] that if the SK
capacity is positive, only two rounds of communication suffice to realize a positive key rate. In fact, they
give a necessary and sufficient condition for the SK capacity to be positive. We begin by reviewing their
results.
Consider some natural number n, and some sets A ⊂ X n and B ⊂ Yn. Denote the probability
distribution of (Xn, Y n, Zn) conditioned on the events Xn ∈ A and Y n ∈ B by pr(x
n, yn, zn) so that
pr(x
n, yn, zn) = 0 if (xn, yn) /∈ A× B; otherwise, we have
pr(x
n, yn, zn) =
pXnY nZn(x
n, yn, zn)
P(Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
(18)
where pXnY nZn(x
n, yn, zn) =
∏n
i=1 pXY Z(xi, yi, zi) is a product distribution, whereas pr(x
n, yn, zn) is not
necessarily a product distribution.
Definition 6 (Orlitsky-Wigderson [10]). Given sets A ⊂ X n and B ⊂ Yn, the legitimate users have a
simple entropic advantage over the eavesdropper in A× B if for some (binary) function f(Xn) we have
Ipr(f(X
n);Y n) > Ipr(f(X
n);Zn) (19)
where the mutual information expressions are calculated according to pr(x
n, yn, zn).
Theorem 1 (Orlitsky-Wigderson [10]). The following three claims are equivalent.
1. S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0.
2. There exists some natural number n, and sets A ⊂ X n and B ⊂ Yn, such that the legitimate users
have a simple entropic advantage over the eavesdropper in A× B.
3. The SK capacity is positive with only two rounds of communication.
Proof. The work [10] does not include proofs. We therefore give a sketch of a proof based on personal
communication with the authors.
We first prove that 1) implies 2). As mentioned in the introduction, an interactive communication F
without private randomization suffices to achieve positive key rates, i.e., without loss of generality we may
assume H(F1|X
n) = H(F2|F1Y
n) = H(F3|F1:2X
n) = ... = 0. Orlitsky and Wigderson observe that for
any interactive communication F without private randomization, the conditional probability distribution
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of (Xn, Y n, Zn) given F = f has the form pr(x
n, yn, zn) for some sets A and B that depend on f . Given
S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 from 1), there is an (n, δ) code with a positive rate R > 0 and a sufficiently small δ.
Observing that 1nI(KA;Y
n|F) ≥ 1nI(KA;KB |F) ≈ R and
1
nI(KA;Z
n|F) ≈ 0, we have
I(KA;Y
n|F)− I(KA;Z
n|F) > 0 (20)
so there exists an F = f such that
I(KA;Y
n|f)− I(KA;Z
n|f) > 0. (21)
Note that given a F = f , KA is a function of X
n.
We next prove that 2) implies 3). Suppose that Alice and Bob observe N independent blocks, each of
which consists of n i.i.d. realizations of (X,Y ). Consider one of the blocks. Suppose that Alice observes
Xn and Bob observes Y n in that block. Alice declares on the public channel whether or not Xn ∈ A, and
Bob declares whether or not Y n ∈ B. If Xn /∈ A or Y n /∈ B, they discard the block. Otherwise, they use
the block for key agreement. The fraction of used blocks is asymptotically equal to P(Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B).
In the used blocks, the conditional pmf of the source is pr(x
n, yn, zn), and Alice has a simple entropic
advantage over Eve, so she can apply a one-way SK generation scheme to produce a shared key with Bob.
Alice’s and Bob’s declarations count as two rounds of communications. However, if Alice declares that
Xn ∈ A and if Y n ∈ B, then Bob hears Alice’s response and attaches the necessary public information
for SK generation to his declaration so that no more than two rounds of communication are required.
Since 1) implies 2) and 2) implies 3), we have that 1) also implies 3). Finally, going from 3) to 1)
is immediate, and going from 3) to 2) is possible by going from 3) to 1) and then 1) to 2), as shown
above.
Finally, a sufficient condition for S(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 for the special class of erasure sources is given in [11].
Definition 7. [11, Definition 4] Given a joint distribution pXY on discrete sets X and Y, let
F (pXY ) = min
qXY
(
max
x,y
(
pXY (x, y)
qXY (x, y)
)
·max
x,y
(
qXY (x, y)
pXY (x, y)
))
where the minimum is taken over all product probability distributions qXY (x, y) = qX(x)qY (y) and where
we set 0/0 := 1, c/0 :=∞ for c > 0. Further, the “deviation from independence of pXY ” is defined as
dind(pXY ) = 1−
1
F (pXY )
.
For example, for the DSBE we have [11, p. 509]
dind(pXY ) = 1−
p
1− p
. (22)
Theorem 2. [11, Theorems 14 and 15] For the erasure source pXY (x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y) with erasure
probability ǫ, we have S(X;Y ‖Z) = B0(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if ǫ ≤ 1 − dind(pXY ). Furthermore, for the special
case of the DSBE source the converse is also true, namely S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if ǫ > 1− dind(pXY ).
In this paper, we generalize Theorem 2 with Theorem 5 below.
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2.5 Classification of Sources with Zero Secret Key Capacity
We introduce a new quantity ∆(X;Y ‖Z) that provides insight into sources with zero key capacity. In
particular, it allows one to compare sources with zero key capacity with each other. When S(X;Y ‖Z) = 0,
it is not possible for Alice and Bob to agree on a shared key. However, it may be still possible for Alice
and Bob to agree on a key that is approximately secret. The quantity ∆(X;Y ‖Z) quantifies the goodness
of the approximate secret key.
Suppose Alice and Bob wish to agree on a single secret bit. That is, instead of achieving a key rate,
they produce bits KA ∈ {1, 2} andKB ∈ {1, 2} respectively. Alice and Bob wish to maximize P[KA = KB ]
while minimizing leakage to Eve who has Zn and the public discussion transcript F. We can measure the
quality of the keys KA and KB via the total variation distance
‖pKAKBZnF − qKAKB · pZnF‖TV (23)
where
qKAKB (kA, kB) =
1
2
1[kA = kB ] (24)
is the ideal distribution on KA×KB = {1, 2}
2. If the total variation distance given in (23) vanishes, Alice
and Bob have perfect secret bits. The same total variation distance as in (24) has been previously utilized
in [28, Eq. 3].
We are interested in the minimum of (23) over all public discussion protocols as we let the number of
source observations n tend to infinity.
Definition 8. Given a source pXY Z(x, y, z), let ∆(X;Y ‖Z) be the infimum of (23) over all public dis-
cussion schemes F (of arbitrary length) that produce single bits KA and KB by Alice and Bob, and where
the number n of source observations tends to infinity.
3 Main Results
We give generic results about the positivity of the SK capacity in Section 3.1. We then restrict attention
to erasure sources in Section 3.2.
3.1 General Sources
Theorem 3. Let pXY (x, y) and qXY (x, y) be two pmfs satisfying qXY (x, y)  pXY (x, y) (as defined in
Definition 5). Consider a channel pZ|XY (z|x, y) and let
pXY Z(x, y, z) = pXY (x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y)
qXY Z(x, y, z) = qXY (x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y). (25)
If the SK capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) under qXY Z(x, y, z) is positive, then the SK capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) under
pXY Z(x, y, z) is also positive.
Theorem 3 is proved in Section 4.1.
The following theorem gives a condition to achieve a positive SK rate in terms of the Chernoff infor-
mation.
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Theorem 4. Consider the source pXY (x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y). Then the following conditions are equivalent.
(i) The key capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) is positive.
(ii) There is an integer n, disjoint non-empty sets A1,A2 ⊂ X
n, and disjoint non-empty sets B1,B2 ⊂ Y
n
such that (see Definition 1)
C
(
p(zn|Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(zn|Xn ∈ A2, Y n ∈ B2))
<
1
2
log
(
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)P(X
n ∈ A2, Y
n ∈ B2)
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y n ∈ B2)P(Xn ∈ A2, Y n ∈ B1)
)
(26)
where (Xn, Y n, Zn) are distributed according to
∏n
i=1 pXY Z(x, y, z).
(iii) ∆(X;Y ‖Z) = 0.
(iv) ∆(X;Y ‖Z) < 3−
√
5
8 ≈ 0.095.
Corollary 1. Considering item (ii) for the special case of n = 1, the above theorem implies that key
capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) is positive if one can find distinct symbols x1, x2 ∈ X and distinct symbols y1, y2 ∈ Y
such that
C(pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)‖pZ|XY (z|x2, y2)) <
1
2
log
(
pXY (x1, y1)pXY (x2, y2)
pXY (x1, y2)pXY (x2, y1)
)
. (27)
Remark 1. In contrast to the characterization given in item 2 of Theorem 1, the characterization in The-
orem 4 considers all probabilities with respect to the unconditional product distribution
∏n
i=1 pXY Z(x, y, z).
Furthermore, (26) can be expressed as∑
zn
p(zn|Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)
α p(zn|Xn ∈ A2, Y
n ∈ B2)
1−α
>
(
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)P(X
n ∈ A2, Y
n ∈ B2)
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y n ∈ B2)P(Xn ∈ A2, Y n ∈ B1)
)− 1
2
(28)
for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Equation (28) involves only a product of probability terms, while the characterization
given in item 2 of Theorem 1 is based on mutual information expressions.
Remark 2. The constant 3−
√
5
8 in Theorem 4 is not necessarily optimal. It is an interesting question to
find the best possible constant, i.e., the minimum possible value of ∆(X;Y ‖Z) over all sources that satisfy
S(X;Y ‖Z) = 0.
Theorem 4 is proved in Section 4.2 by using a hypothesis testing approach. The left hand side of
(26) is the error exponent of the adversary in a hypothesis testing problem while the right hand side is
the error exponent of the legitimate parties. The theorem shows that key agreement is feasible when the
legitimate parties have a better exponent than the adversary.
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3.2 Erasure Sources
We illustrate the condition (26) for erasure sources and relate it to previously known bounds. Suppose we
are given a joint probability distribution pXY (x, y). Without loss of generality, we assume that pX(x) > 0
and pY (y) > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y. We define a path, which is used in the proofs of the theorems given
below.
Definition 9. A sequence (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xk, yk) forms a path if all xi’s with xi ∈ X are distinct and
also all yi’s with yi ∈ Y are distinct. We say the length of the path is 2k and we assign the following value
to the path ( ∏k
i=1 pXY (xi, yi)
pXY (x1, yk)
∏k
i=2 pXY (xi, yi−1)
)1/k
. (29)
Let ǫ1 be the minimum value of all possible paths and ǫ2 be the minimum value of all possible paths of
length at most four. In particular, we have
ǫ2 = min
x1 6=x2,y1 6=y2
(
pXY (x1, y1)pXY (x2, y2)
pXY (x1, y2)pXY (x2, y1)
)1
2
. (30)
Example 2. Suppose that X and Y are binary with a joint probability distribution pXY (x, y). Then
paths of length two are assigned the value 1. Because the xi’s and yi’s are distinct in a path, paths of
length more than four do not exist. There are multiple paths of length four. For instance, (x1 = 0, y1 =
1, x2 = 1, y2 = 0) is assigned the value √
pXY (0, 1)pXY (1, 0)√
pXY (0, 0)pXY (1, 1)
and (x1 = 0, y1 = 0, x2 = 1, y2 = 1) is assigned the value√
pXY (0, 0)pXY (1, 1)√
pXY (0, 1)pXY (1, 0)
.
All other paths have one of the above two values and therefore
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = min
{√
pXY (0, 1)pXY (1, 0)√
pXY (0, 0)pXY (1, 1)
,
√
pXY (0, 0)pXY (1, 1)√
pXY (0, 1)pXY (1, 0)
}
. (31)
Note that one of the terms inside the minimum is less than or equal to one. We therefore do not need to
consider paths of length two whose values are one.
We now give lower and upper bounds on the maximum erasure probability for which the SK capacity
is zero for an erasure source.
Theorem 5. For the erasure source pXY (x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y) with erasure probability ǫ, we have S(X;Y ‖Z) =
0 if ǫ ≤ ǫ1, and S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if ǫ > ǫ2, where ǫ1 and ǫ2 are as in Definition 9.
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Theorem 5 is proved in Section 4.3. Positivity of S(X;Y ‖Z) for ǫ > ǫ2 is derived by using the result
of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 generalizes [11, Theorems 14 and 15] which was summarized in Theorem 2. In the proof,
we show (via the duality theorem for linear programs) that ǫ1 (of Definition 9) is the same quantity
as 1 − dind(pXY ) (of Definition 7). Observe that Theorem 5 claims S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if ǫ > ǫ2 for any
arbitrary pmf pXY Z , while [11, Theorem 14] considers only the DSBE source. In fact, the code used to
prove S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 for general distributions differs from the one used by [11] for the DSBE source, and
utilizes the swapping idea mentioned in the introduction. Observe that in Definition 9, because the xi’s
and yi’s are distinct in a path, the number of (xi, yi) pairs must satisfy k ≤ min{|X |, |Y|}. Thus, ǫ1 = ǫ2
if X or Y is binary. For this special case, the above theorem gives a tight bound on the maximum erasure
probability, which is novel. We also have ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 0 when pXY (x
∗, y∗) = 0 for some (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y.
This can be seen by starting the path with x1 = x
∗, y1 = y∗.
Remark 3. I(X;Y ) is a measure of the correlation of X and Y . For example, we have S(X;Y ‖Z) =
I(X;Y ) when Z is independent of (X,Y ). Similarly, the quantities ǫ1 and ǫ2 can be used to define
measures of correlation. For instance, Maurer and Wolf take
dind(pXY ) = 1−
1
F (pXY )
= 1− ǫ1
as a measure of correlation. We propose
log F (pXY ) = log
1
ǫ1
(32)
as yet another measure. Observe that log F (pXY ) can be expressed in terms of Renyi-divergence of order
infinity:
log
1
ǫ1
= logF (pXY ) = min
q(x)q(y)
(
D∞(p(x, y)‖q(x)q(y)) +D∞(q(x)q(y)‖p(x, y))
)
. (33)
We define the Renyi-Jeffrey’s divergence (RJ divergence) between two distributions p and q as
DRJα (p‖q) ,
1
2
(Dα(p‖q) +Dα(q‖p)) (34)
which is just Jeffrey’s divergence (symmetrized KL divergence) in its Renyi form. We next define the RJ
information of order α as the minimum RJ divergence between a given joint distribution and all product
distributions:
RJα(X;Y ) , min
q(x)q(y)
DRJα (p(x, y)‖q(x)q(y)). (35)
Observe that RJ∞(X;Y ) = 12 log F (pXY ). The way RJ information is defined in (35) parallels the way
α-Renyi mutual information is defined in [29].
Similarly for ǫ2, we propose
log
1
ǫ2
(36)
as a new measure of correlation (see (147) below) and study its properties in Appendix B.
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We now study the one-way SK rate and the lower bound L¯(X;Y ‖Z) obtained from (14) for an erasure
source.
Theorem 6. For an erasure source pXY (x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y) with erasure probability ǫ such that pX(x) >
0, pY (y) > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, the following statements hold.
1. The one-way SK rate from Alice to Bob vanishes if and only if
ǫ ≤ 1− η(pY |X(y|x)) (37)
where η(·) is defined in (9). A similar statement holds for the one-way SK rate from Bob to Alice.
2. We have L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if and only if
ǫ ≤ 1− max
qXY (x,y):
qXY (x,y)pXY (x,y)
ρ2m(qXY (x, y)) (38)
where ρm(·) is defined in (8).
3. The upper bound B0(X;Y ‖Z) in (16) is zero if and only if ǫ ≤ ǫ3 where
ǫ3 = max
|Z|∑
t=1
min
x,y:pX,Y (x,y)>0
δx,y,t (39)
and the maximum is over all δx,y,t such that δx,y,t ≥ 0, the matrix [pXY (x, y)δx,y,t] has rank 1 for all
t, and
∑|Z|
t=1 δx,y,t = 1 for all x, y. Here, for every t, [pXY (x, y)δx,y,t] is a matrix with dimensions
|X | × |Y| and is defined as in the statement of Theorem 8 in Section 4.3.
4. The upper bound B1(X;Y ‖Z) in (17) is zero if and only if
1− ǫ ≥ inf η(p(z¯|x, y)) (40)
where the infimum is taken over channels p(z¯|x, y) for which I(X;Y |Z¯) = 0 for p(x, y, z¯) =
p(x, y)p(z¯|x, y).
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Section 4.5.
Remark 4. The value of ǫ3 given in part 3 of Theorem 6 is greater than or equal to ǫ1, given in Definition
9. To see this, observe that from Theorem 8 one can find some δ˜x,y ∈ [0, 1] such that
ǫ1 = min
x,y
δ˜x,y (41)
and the matrix [pXY (x, y)δ˜x,y] has rank one. To prove that ǫ1 ≤ ǫ3, we need to find appropriate δx,y,t for
t = 1, 2, · · · , |Z| such that
min
x,y
δ˜x,y ≤
|Z|∑
t=1
min
x,y:pXY (x,y)>0
δx,y,t. (42)
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As shown in the proof of part 3 of Theorem 6, the quantity ǫ3 remains the same if we allow t to take
values in a larger set {1, 2, · · · ,M} for some M > |Z|. We define δx,y,t for t ∈ {0} ∪ X × Y as follows:
δx,y,0 = δ˜x,y and for any (x
′, y′) ∈ X × Y, we have
δx,y,t=(x′,y′) = 1[x
′ = x, y′ = y](1− δ˜x,y). (43)
We have
∑
t δx,y,t = 1 and [pXY (x, y)δx,y,t] has rank 1 for all t ∈ {0} ∪ X × Y. Furthermore, we have
min
x,y:pXY (x,y)>0
δx,y,t=(x′,y′) = 0 ∀x
′, y′. (44)
Therefore, we compute∑
t
min
x,y:pX,Y (x,y)>0
δx,y,t = min
x,y:pX,Y (x,y)>0
δx,y,0 = min
x,y:pX,Y (x,y)>0
δ˜x,y ≥ min
x,y
δ˜x,y. (45)
Computing the bounds on ǫ given in Theorem 6 is cumbersome for general distributions. Thus, we
next focus on the DSBE source and illustrate the suboptimality of the lower bound L¯(X;Y ‖Z) obtained
from (14) with a DSBE source example.
3.3 DSBE Source Example
Using (31) and Theorem 5, the SK capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) is zero if and only if
ǫ ≤
min{p, 1− p}
max{p, 1 − p}
. (46)
We now study the lower bound L¯(X;Y ‖Z) in (14). The main result of this subsection is to show that
S(X;Y ‖Z) 6= L¯(X;Y ‖Z) for a DSBE(p, ǫ) source if
min{p, 1− p}
max{p, 1− p}
< ǫ ≤ 4p(1− p). (47)
In fact, we show that L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 for erasure probabilities ǫ in the above interval since we know from
(46) that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 in this interval. This result illustrates that the lower bound L¯(X;Y ‖Z) is loose.
We remark that the lower bound is tight, i.e., S(X;Y ‖Z) = L¯(X;Y ‖Z), for all previously considered
joint probability distributions pXY Z(x, y, z) for which the SK capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) is known. For instance,
if X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain, then assigning U1 = X and k = 1 in (14) recovers the SK capacity
S(X;Y ‖Z) = I(X;Y |Z) achieved by one-way communication from X to Y . Similarly, consider the
reversely degraded example from [1]. Let X = (X1,X2), Y = (Y1, Y2), and Z = (Z1, Z2), where all
(Xi, Yi, Zi) tuples for i = 1, 2 are mutually independent. If X1 → Y1 → Z1 and Y2 → X2 → Z2 form
Markov chains, assigning U1 = X1 and U2 = Y2 in (14) recovers the SK capacity S(X;Y ‖Z) = I(X;Y |Z).
We give the condition for L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 for a DSBE source in the following theorem and prove it in
Section 4.6.
Theorem 7. Let (X,Y,Z) be a DSBE source with parameters (p, ǫ). Then L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if and only if
the one-way SK rate from Alice to Bob (or Bob to Alice) vanishes, i.e., if and only if
ǫ ≤ 4p(1 − p). (48)
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Figure 1: SK capacity bounds for a DSBE(0.4, ǫ) source. The curve labeled Sow(X;Y ‖Z) is zero if and
only if ǫ ≤ 4p(1 − p).
In Fig. 1, we plot the known lower and upper bounds on S(X;Y ‖Z) to illustrate the gaps between
them. Consider a DSBE source (X,Y,Z) with parameters (p = 0.4, ǫ). This source has
I(X;Y ) =
I(X;Y |Z)
ǫ
.
Therefore, we plot only I(X;Y |Z) and do not consider the upper bound I(X;Y ). We also plot the
improved upper bound (see (16))
Bsub0 (X;Y ‖Z) = I(X;Y |J) (49)
where
J =


0 if Z = (0, 0),
1 if Z = (1, 1),
e otherwise
(50)
which takes on non-zero values for ǫ > ǫ2 =
p
1−p , as in Theorem 5. In Fig. 1, Sow(X;Y ‖Z) denotes the
one-way communication capacity. This curve attains non-zero values for ǫ > 4p(1− p), which is the case
also for L¯(X;Y ‖Z) due to Theorem 7. Similarly, we plot the rates achieved by the repetition codes of [2]
that are multi-letter and multi-round protocols. The N -repetition code achieves the SK rate
RN (X;Y ‖Z) =
pN + (1− p)N
N
max
{
0, ǫN − h
(
pN
pN + (1− p)N
)}
. (51)
In Fig. 1, we plot the rates for N = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Fig. 1 illustrates that there is a gap between the lower
bounds RN (X;Y ‖Z) for N = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and B
sub
0 (X;Y ‖Z) for
p
1−p ≤ ǫ < 1.
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4 Proofs
4.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Without loss of generality, assume that the symbol 0 is included in both alphabets X and Y. Assume
that qXY Z(x, y, z) = a(x)b(y)pXY Z(x, y, z). Let a¯ = maxx a(x) > 0 and b¯ = maxy b(y) > 0.
We define X ′ and Y ′ on X and Y, respectively, as follows:
pXX′Y Y ′Z(x
′, x, y′, y, z) = pX′|X(x′|x)pY ′|Y (y′|y)pXY Z(x, y, z) (52)
where pX′|X(x′|x) and pY ′|Y (y′|y) satisfy
pX′|X(x′ = 0|x) =
a(x)
a¯
, pY ′|Y (y′ = 0|y) =
b(y)
b¯
. (53)
The values of pX′|X(x′|x) and pY ′|Y (y′|y) for x′, y′ 6= 0 are not important for the proof and can be chosen
arbitrarily. Observe that (53) implies
pX′Y ′(0, 0) =
∑
x,y,z
a(x)
a¯
b(y)
b¯
pXY Z(x, y, z) =
1
a¯b¯
∑
x,y,z
qXY Z(x, y, z) =
1
a¯b¯
> 0 (54)
and
pXY Z|X′Y ′(x, y, z|x′ = 0, y′ = 0) = a(x)b(y)pXY Z(x, y, z) = qXY Z(x, y, z). (55)
Suppose that Alice, Bob and Eve observe i.i.d. repetitions of X,Y,Z according to pXY Z(x, y, z). We
now show that they can simulate i.i.d. repetitions according to qXY Z(x, y, z). Alice has access to X
n. She
passes Xn through
∏n
i=1 pX′i|Xi(x
′
i|xi) to produce a sequence X
′n. Alice then puts into the public channel
the list of indices i such that X ′i = 0. Similarly, Bob passes Y
n through
∏n
i=1 pY ′i |Yi(y
′
i|yi) to produce Y
′n
and puts into the public channel the list of indices i such that Y ′i = 0. Alice and Bob then consider the
observations (Xi, Yi) for indices i where (X
′
i, Y
′
i ) = (0, 0), and discard their observations for other indices.
The induced probability distribution on (Xi, Yi, Zi) given the event (X
′
i, Y
′
i ) = (0, 0) is qXY Z(x, y, z). Alice
and Bob can now proceed with any key agreement protocol for qXY Z(x, y, z) that achieves a positive key
rate.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4
We prove the equivalence by showing that (ii) implies (i), (i) implies (iii), (iii) implies (iv), and (iv) implies
(ii). The fact that (iii) implies (iv) is trivial, so we prove the other three implications in the following
subsections.
4.2.1 (ii) implies (i)
We claim that proving Corollary 1 establishes the claim that (ii) implies (i). To see this, assume that
(26) holds for some integer n and disjoint non-empty sets A1,A2 ⊂ X
n, and disjoint non-empty sets
B1,B2 ⊂ Y
n. Let X ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} be a function of Xn defined as follows: X ′ = 1 if Xn ∈ A1, X ′ = 2
if Xn ∈ A2 and X
′ = 3 otherwise. We defined Y ′ as a function of Y n in a similar manner using B1
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and B2. Finally, let Z
′ = Zn. We have, S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if S(X ′;Y ′‖Z ′) > 0 since Alice and Bob
can produce X ′ and Y ′ from Xn and Y n respectively. Equation (27) for (X ′, Y ′, Z ′) with the choice
x′1 = 1, x
′
2 = 2, y
′
1 = 1, y
′
2 = 2 is equivalent to (26) for the triple (X
n, Y n, Zn) with the sets A1,A2,B1
and B2.
It remains to prove Corollary 1. In other words, we wish to prove that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if (27) holds
for distinct symbols x1, x2 ∈ X and distinct symbols y1, y2 ∈ Y. Let pij = pXY (xi, yj) for i, j = 1, 2. By
(27), we have
1
2
log
(
p11p22
p12p21
)
> 0
or equivalently
p11p22 > p12p21. (56)
Consider some even natural number n and the sets
A = {x1,x2}, B = {y1,y2} (57)
where
x1 = (x1, x1, · · · , x1, x2, x2, · · · , x2),
x2 = (x2, x2, · · · , x2, x1, x1, · · · , x1),
y1 = (y1, y1, · · · , y1, y2, y2, · · · , y2),
y2 = (y2, y2, · · · , y2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n/2
, y1, y1, · · · , y1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n/2
). (58)
As in the proof of Theorem 1 and Maurer’s example in [2, p. 740], suppose that Alice and Bob observe
N independent blocks, each having i.i.d. realizations of (X,Y ). For each block, Alice declares whether
Xn ∈ A and Bob declares whether Y n ∈ B. If Xn /∈ A or Y n /∈ B, they discard the block. Otherwise,
they keep the block and use it for SK agreement. To prove that key generation is feasible, it suffices to
show that
I(Xn;Y n|Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)− I(Xn;Zn|Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) > 0 (59)
for large n. Equation (59) implies that the legitimate users have a simple entropic advantage over the
eavesdropper (see Definition 6) and hence a positive key rate can be achieved. We now show that (59) is
satisfied. For any three random variables X,Y,Z we have
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) = H(X,Y |Z)−H(Y |X,Z)−H(X|Y ) ≥ H(X,Y |Z)−H(Y |X)−H(X|Y ).
Thus, it suffices to show that for large n we have
H(Xn, Y n|Zn,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) > H(Y n|Xn,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) +H(Xn|Y n,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B). (60)
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We compute
P(Xn = x1, Y
n = y1) = P(X
n = x2, Y
n = y2) = p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22
P(Xn = x2, Y
n = y1) = P(X
n = x1, Y
n = y2) = p
n/2
12 p
n/2
21 .
The conditional probability distribution of (Xn, Y n) given that Xn ∈ A and Y n ∈ B is
P(Xn = x1, Y
n = y1|X
n ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
= P(Xn = x2, Y
n = y2|X
n ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
=
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22
2(p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22 + p
n/2
12 p
n/2
21 )
(61)
P(Xn = x2, Y
n = y1|X
n ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
= P(Xn = x1, Y
n = y2|X
n ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
=
p
n/2
21 p
n/2
12
2(p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22 + p
n/2
12 p
n/2
21 )
. (62)
If Xn ∈ A and Y n ∈ B, then we can model the conditional joint probability distribution of (Xn, Y n) as
a DSBS with parameter
p˜n =
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22 + p
n/2
12 p
n/2
21
due to symmetry in (61) and (62). Thus, we obtain
H(Xn|Y n,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) = H(Y n|Xn,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) = h(p˜n) (63)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function. We have h(p) ≤ −2(1− p) log(1− p) for any p ∈ [0.5, 1]. Using
(56), we have p˜n ∈ [0.5, 1] and
lim
n→∞(1− p˜n)
1
n =
(
p12p21
p11p22
) 1
2
.
Hence, we have
lim
n→∞h(p˜n)
1
n ≤ lim
n→∞ (−2(1− p˜n) log(1− p˜n))
1
n =
(
p12p21
p11p22
) 1
2
(64)
and we obtain
lim
n→∞H(X
n|Y n,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
1
n = lim
n→∞H(Y
n|Xn,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
1
n ≤
(
p12p21
p11p22
) 1
2
. (65)
This equation implies that
lim
n→∞ [H(X
n|Y n,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) +H(Y n|Xn,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)]
1
n ≤
(
p12p21
p11p22
) 1
2
(66)
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which gives a bound on the asymptotics of the right hand side in (60). We now consider the term on the
left hand side in (60). Our aim is to show that
lim inf
n→∞ H(X
n, Y n|Zn,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
1
n ≥ exp
(
− C
(
pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)
∣∣∣∣pZ|XY (z|x2, y2))). (67)
This equation together with (66) shows that (60) holds for large values of n if(
p12p21
p11p22
) 1
2
< exp
(
− C
(
pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)
∣∣∣∣pZ|XY (z|x2, y2))) (68)
which is equivalent to the condition
C
(
pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)
∣∣∣∣pZ|XY (z|x2, y2)) < 12 log
(
p11p22
p12p21
)
. (69)
It remains to prove (67). From the perspective of Eve who observes Zn, there are four possibilities
of (Xn, Y n) = (xi,yj) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Eve can view this as a hypothesis testing problem. For example,
given (Xn, Y n) = (x1,y1), the conditional probability distribution of (Zi, Zn
2
+i) is
pZ|XY (zi|x1, y1) · pZ|XY (zn
2
+i|x2, y2)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 − 1. Furthermore, Zi and Zn2+i are conditionally independent given (X
n, Y n) = (x1,y1)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 − 1. Therefore, given the hypothesis (X
n, Y n) = (x1,y1), Eve observes n/2 i.i.d.
repetitions
q
(11)
ZaZb
(za, zb) = pZ|XY (za|x1, y1)pZ|XY (zb|x2, y2).
More generally, given the hypothesis (Xn, Y n) = (xi,yj), Eve observes n/2 i.i.d. repetitions
q
(ij)
ZaZb
(za, zb) = pZ|XY (za|xi, yj)pZ|XY (zb|x3−i, y3−j)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
We remark that the prior probability of the hypothesis (Xn, Y n) = (xi,yj) depends on n; see (61)
and (62). Therefore, we cannot directly apply results from the hypothesis testing literature, where fixed
prior hypothesis probabilities are assumed. We use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. [30, Eq. (10)] For any arbitrary pUV (u, v) and any two distinct symbols u1, u2, we have
H(U |V ) ≥ log(2)
(
pU (u1)
∑
v∈D
pV |U (v|u1) + pU(u2)
∑
v∈Dc
pV |U(v|u2)
)
where D = {v : pUV (u1, v) < pUV (u2, v)}.
We apply Lemma 1 with U = (Xn, Y n), V = Zn, and
pUV ((x
n, yn), zn) = pXn,Y n,Zn(x
n, yn, zn|Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) (70)
u1 = (x1,y1) (71)
u2 = (x2,y2). (72)
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Using (61), we have
pU(u1) = pU (u2) =
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22
2(p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22 + p
n/2
12 p
n/2
21 )
(73)
and we obtain
H(Xn, Y n|Zn,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
1
n
≥
(
log(2)
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22 + p
n/2
12 p
n/2
21
) 1
n
×
{
1
2
∑
zn∈D
pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x1,y1,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) +
1
2
∑
zn∈Dc
pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x2,y2,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
} 1
n
.
(74)
Using (56), we have
lim
n→∞
(
log(2)
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22
p
n/2
11 p
n/2
22 + p
n/2
12 p
n/2
21
) 1
n
= 1. (75)
Next, observe that
D =
{
zn : pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x1,y1) < pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x2,y2)
}
(76)
is the maximum a-posteriori probability (MAP) decision region for a new binary hypothesis testing prob-
lem with two equiprobable hypotheses, i.e., (Xn, Y n) = (x1,y1) and (X
n, Y n) = (x2,y2). In this problem,
Eve observes n/2 i.i.d. repetitions of q
(11)
ZaZb
(za, zb) under the first hypothesis, and n/2 i.i.d. repetitions of
q
(22)
ZaZb
(za, zb) under the second hypothesis. The expression
1
2
∑
zn∈D
pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x1,y1,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) +
1
2
∑
zn∈Dc
pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x2,y2,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
is the error probability, which is asymptotically equal to exp(−n2E) where
E = C
(
q
(11)
ZaZb
∣∣∣∣q(22)ZaZb) = 2C(pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)∣∣∣∣pZ|XY (z|x2, y2)).
Therefore, we obtain
lim
n→∞
{
1
2
∑
zn∈D
pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x1,y1,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B) +
1
2
∑
zn∈Dc
pZn|Xn,Y n(zn|x2,y2,Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
} 1
n
= exp
(
− C
(
pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)‖pZ|XY (z|x2, y2)
))
. (77)
Combining (74), (75), and (77) establishes (67).
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4.2.2 (i) implies (iii)
Suppose that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0. Because Alice and Bob can produce a key at a positive rate, they can
also produce a key of length one bit. Maurer and Wolf [31] show the equivalence of the strong and weak
notions of security for the source model problem. More specifically, from [31] and using S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0,
we conclude that, given any δ > 0, there is an interactive communication protocol yielding bits KA and
KB for Alice and Bob such that P[K = KA = KB] ≥ 1− δ for some uniform bit K ∈ {1, 2}. Furthermore,
we have
I(K;ZnF) ≤ δ.
The triangle inequality gives
‖pKAKBZnF − qKAKB · pZnF‖TV ≤ ‖pKAKBZnF − pKAKB · pZnF‖TV +‖pKAKB · pZnF − qKAKB · pZnF‖TV
= ‖pKAKBZnF − pKAKB · pZnF‖TV + ‖pKAKB − qKAKB‖TV (78)
and by Fano’s inequality we have
I(KKAKB ;Z
nF) ≤ I(K;ZnF) +H(KAKB |K) ≤ δ + h(δ) + 3δ. (79)
Therefore, we have the bound
D(pKAKBZnF‖pKAKBpZnF) = I(KAKB ;Z
nF) ≤ 4δ + h(δ). (80)
By Pinsker’s inequality, we have
‖pKAKBZnF − pKAKBpZnF‖TV ≤
√
2δ +
1
2
h(δ). (81)
Next, from uniformity of K and P[K = KA = KB] ≥ 1− δ, we have∣∣∣∣pKAKB(i, i) − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ for i = 1, 2 (82)
and
pKAKB (i, j) ≤ δ for i 6= j. (83)
Therefore, we can write
‖pKAKB − qKAKB‖TV ≤ 2δ. (84)
From (78), (81) and (84), we obtain
‖pKAKBZnF − qKAKB · pZnF‖TV ≤
√
2δ +
1
2
h(δ) + 2δ. (85)
The right hand side of the above equation tends to zero as δ tends to zero.
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4.2.3 (iv) implies (ii)
It suffices to prove Lemma 2 below. This lemma identifies sets Ai and Bi such that (26) holds if
− log (1− 4δ) < log
1
2 − 2δ
2δ
. (86)
Equation (86) holds for δ < 3−
√
5
8 . This completes the proof.
Lemma 2. Consider a code with source strings of length n, interactive communication F = (F1, F2, ...)
satisfying (4), and secret key bits KA ∈ {1, 2} and KB ∈ {1, 2}, created by Alice and Bob after public
discussion. We define
δ = ‖pKAKBZnF − qKAKB · pZn,F‖TV . (87)
One can find disjoint non-empty subsets A1,A2 ⊂ X
n and disjoint non-empty subsets B1,B2 ⊂ Y
n such
that
C
(
p(zn|Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)
∣∣∣∣p(zn|Xn ∈ A2, Y n ∈ B2)) ≤ − log (1− 4δ) (88)
and
1
2
log
(
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)P(X
n ∈ A2, Y
n ∈ B2)
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y n ∈ B2)P(Xn ∈ A2, Y n ∈ B1)
)
≥ log
1
2 − 2δ
2δ
. (89)
Proof. There is a realization F = f such that P[F = f ] > 0 and∣∣∣∣pKAKBZn|F(kA, kB , zn|f)− qKAKB(kA, kB) · pZn|F(zn|f)∣∣∣∣TV ≤ δ. (90)
From the data processing property of the total variation distance, we have∣∣∣∣pKAKB|F(kA, kB |f)− qKAKB(kA, kB)∣∣∣∣TV ≤ δ (91)
and therefore
P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f) ≥
1
2
− 2δ (92)
P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f) ≥
1
2
− 2δ (93)
P(KA = 1,KB = 2|F = f) ≤ 2δ (94)
P(KA = 2,KB = 1|F = f) ≤ 2δ. (95)
As in the proof of Theorem 1, the conditional probability distributions of (Xn, Y n, Zn) given F = f
have the form pr(x
n, yn, zn) given in (18) for some sets A and B that depend on f . Furthermore, given
F = f , the key KA is a function of X
n. We partition A into A1∪A2 as follows: Ai = {x
n : KA(x
n, f) = i}
for i = 1, 2. We define Bi similarly using KB .
Observe that
P(KA = i,KB = j|F = f) =
P(Xn ∈ Ai, Y
n ∈ Bj)
P(Xn ∈ A, Y n ∈ B)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. (96)
21
From (92)-(96), we obtain
1
2
log
(
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)P(X
n ∈ A2, Y
n ∈ B2)
P(Xn ∈ A1, Y n ∈ B2)P(Xn ∈ A2, Y n ∈ B1)
)
=
1
2
log
(
P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)
P(KA = 1,KB = 2|F = f)P(KA = 2,KB = 1|F = f)
)
≥
1
2
log
(12 − 2δ)
2
(2δ)2
= log
1
2 − 2δ
2δ
. (97)
Next, from (90) we have∑
zn
∣∣∣∣P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f) − 12pZn|F(zn|f)
∣∣∣∣ (98)
+
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 2, kB = 2, f) − 12pZn|F(zn|f)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ (99)
and the triangle inequality gives∑
zn
∣∣P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f)
−P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(z
n|kA = 2, kB = 2, f)
∣∣ ≤ 2δ. (100)
The triangle inequality further implies∑
zn
∣∣∣∣12pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f) − 12pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 2, kB = 2, f)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣∣P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f)
− P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(z
n|kA = 2, kB = 2, f)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f)− 12pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f)
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 2, kB = 2, f)− 12pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 2, kB = 2, f)
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣∣P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f)
− P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(z
n|kA = 2, kB = 2, f)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)− 12
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)− 12
∣∣∣∣
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≤
∑
zn
∣∣∣∣∣P(KA = 1,KB = 1|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(zn|kA = 1, kB = 1, f)
− P(KA = 2,KB = 2|F = f)pZn|KA,KBF(z
n|kA = 2, kB = 2, f)
∣∣∣∣∣
+ 2‖pKAKB|F(kA, kB |f)− qKAKB(kA, kB)‖TV
≤ 2δ + 2δ (101)
where we use (91) and (100) in the last step. Observe that
pZn|KAKBF(z
n|kA = i, kB = i, f) = pZn(z
n|Xn ∈ Ai, Y
n ∈ Bi), i ∈ {1, 2}. (102)
Therefore, (101) shows that
‖pZn(z
n|Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)− pZn(z
n|Xn ∈ A2, Y
n ∈ B2)‖TV ≤ 4δ (103)
and by (7) we have
C(p(zn|Xn ∈ A1, Y
n ∈ B1)‖p(z
n|Xn ∈ A2, Y
n ∈ B2)) ≤ − log (1− 4δ) . (104)
4.3 Proof of Theorem 5
The fact that S(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if ǫ ≤ ǫ1 follows from Theorem 2 if we can show that ǫ1 = 1−dind =
1
F (pXY )
.
Observe that F (pXY ) is (see Definition 7) the minimum over all product measures qXY (x, y) = qX(x)qY (y)
of
max
x,y
(
pXY (x, y)
qXY (x, y)
)
·max
x,y
(
qXY (x, y)
pXY (x, y)
)
. (105)
This is because (105) would not change if we multiply qXY (x, y) by a positive constant. Moreover, by the
same argument, we can restrict attention to product measures qXY (x, y) = qX(x)qY (y) satisfying
max
x,y
(
qXY (x, y)
pXY (x, y)
)
= 1. (106)
The equality ǫ1 =
1
F (pXY )
follows because of the following alternative characterization of ǫ1.
Theorem 8. Define a matrix [pXY (x, y)δx,y] of dimensions |X |×|Y| whose rows and columns are indexed
by the realizations of X and Y , respectively, and whose (x, y) entry is pXY (x, y)δx,y for all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y.
We have
ǫ1 = maxmin
x,y
δx,y (107)
where the maximum is over all δx,y ∈ [0, 1] such that the matrix [pXY (x, y)δx,y] has rank one.
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The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Section 4.4.
It remains to show that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if ǫ > ǫ2. Suppose that ǫ2 is obtained with the minimizer
path (x1, y1, x2, y2) so that
ǫ2 =
(
pXY (x1, y1)pXY (x2, y2)
pXY (x1, y2)pXY (x2, y1)
)1/2
. (108)
We prove that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 for ǫ > ǫ2. Since the value of the path (x1, y1, x2, y2) is less than or equal
to the value of the path (x1, y2, x2, y1), we have
ǫ2 =
(
min{p11p22, p12p21}
max{p11p22, p12p21}
)1/2
where pij = pXY (xi, yj) for i, j = 1, 2. From Theorem 4, we have S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if
C
(
pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)
∣∣∣∣pZ|XY (z|x2, y2)) < − log ǫ2.
But observe that
C
(
pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)
∣∣∣∣pZ|XY (z|x2, y2)) = max
α∈[0,1]
− log
(∑
z
pZ|XY (z|x1, y1)αpZ|XY (z|x2, y2)1−α
)
≤ max
α∈[0,1]
− log
(
pZ|XY (z = e|x1, y1)αpZ|XY (z = e|x2, y2)1−α
)
= max
α∈[0,1]
− log
(
ǫαǫ1−α
)
= − log(ǫ) (109)
which proves that S(X;Y ‖Z) > 0 if ǫ > ǫ2.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 8
Let
ǫ˜1 = maxmin
x,y
δx,y (110)
where the maximization is over all δx,y ∈ [0, 1] such that the matrix [pXY (x, y)δx,y] has rank one. We
prove that ǫ˜1 = ǫ1.
Observe that if pXY (x
∗, y∗) = 0 for some x∗, y∗ ∈ X ×Y, then ǫ1 = 0, which follows from Definition 9.
We now prove that ǫ˜1 is also zero. Consider some arbitrary δx,y such that [pXY (x, y)δx,y] has rank one.
Since pXY (x
∗, y∗)δx∗,y∗ = 0, we must have either pXY (x∗, y)δx∗,y = 0 for all y ∈ Y or pXY (x, y∗)δx,y∗ = 0
for all x ∈ X . Assume that pXY (x
∗, y)δx∗,y = 0 for all y ∈ Y. Since there exists a y such that pXY (x∗, y) >
0, we obtain δx∗,y = 0 for some y ∈ Y. Hence, minx,y δx,y = 0 and ǫ˜1 = 0.
Based on the discussions above, we may assume that pXY (x, y) > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y. In this
case, it follows that ǫ1 > 0. We also have ǫ˜1 > 0 since one valid choice for δx,y is δx,y =
k
pXY (x,y)
, where
k = minx,y pXY (x, y). Since ǫ˜1 > 0, we take the maximum in (110) only over positive δx,y.
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Consider some δx,y ∈ (0, 1] such that [pXY (x, y)δx,y] has rank one. In other words, pXY (x, y)δx,y =
em(x)en(y) has a product form for some m(x) and n(y). Taking logarithms, we obtain
log pXY (x, y) + log δx,y = m(x) + n(y). (111)
We can express the problem as finding the maximum value of ǫ˜1 ∈ (0, 1] such that for some m(x) and
n(y), we have for ∀x, y
m(x)+n(y)≤ log pXY (x, y)≤m(x)+n(y)−log ǫ˜1. (112)
We can view this as a linear programming problem to minimize A , − log ǫ˜1 subject to
m(x) + n(y) ≤ log pXY (x, y) (113)
log pXY (x, y) ≤ m(x) + n(y) +A. (114)
We consider the dual of this linear programming problem. Multiplying (113) by some γ(x, y) ≥ 0 and
(114) by some µ(x, y) ≥ 0, we obtain∑
x,y
γ(x, y) (m(x) + n(y)) +
∑
x,y
µ(x, y) log pXY (x, y)
≤
∑
x,y
γ(x, y) log pXY (x, y) +
∑
x,y
µ(x, y)
(
m(x) + n(y) +A
)
.
Since we are interested in the best lower bound on A, we should choose γ and µ such that the coefficient
of A is equal to one and the coefficients of free variables m(x) and n(y) vanish. The coefficient of A is
one only if
∑
x,y µ(x, y) = 1. Furthermore, to cancel out the auxiliary variables m(x) and n(y) from both
sides, we must have
∑
x γ(x, y) =
∑
x µ(x, y) for all y ∈ Y, and
∑
y γ(x, y) =
∑
y µ(x, y) for all x ∈ X .
This implies that γ(x, y) and µ(x, y) are probability distributions with the same marginals. We denote
their marginal probabilities by µ(x) = γ(x) and µ(y) = γ(y).
The dual of the linear programming problem is
A = max
∑
x,y
(µ(x, y)− γ(x, y)) log pXY (x, y) (115)
where the maximization is over all pmfs µ(x, y), γ(x, y) with the same marginals. Since A = − log ǫ˜1, we
have
ǫ˜1 = min
∏
x,y
pXY (x, y)
−µ(x,y)+γ(x,y) (116)
where the minimization is over all pmfs µ(x, y), γ(x, y) with the same marginals.
The requirement that the pmfs µ(x, y), γ(x, y) should have the same marginals imposes a number of
linear constraints on µ(x, y) and γ(x, y). This indicates that the set of all pmfs µ(x, y), γ(x, y) with the
same marginals is a polytope. We maximize a linear equation over this polytope in (115).
We first list three claims. These are proved below and used to show that ǫ˜1 = ǫ1.
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Claim 1: If (µ, γ) is a minimizer for (116) and
µ(x, y) = λµ1(x, y) + (1− λ)µ2(x, y) (117)
γ(x, y) = λγ1(x, y) + (1− λ)γ2(x, y) (118)
where µi(x, y), γi(x, y) are pmfs with the same marginals for i = 1, 2 and 0 < λ < 1, then (µi(x, y), γi(x, y))
are also minimizers for i = 1, 2.
Given any probability distribution µ, we define Support(µ) as the set of realizations with positive
occurrence probability.
Claim 2: Given pmfs (µ, γ) with the same marginals, if one can find pmfs µ1(x, y), γ1(x, y) with the
same marginals such that Support(µ1) ⊆ Support(µ) and Support(γ1) ⊆ Support(γ), then there is a λ with
0 < λ < 1 and a (µ2(x, y), γ2(x, y)) with the same marginals such that
µ(x, y) = λµ1(x, y) + (1− λ)µ2(x, y) (119)
γ(x, y) = λγ1(x, y) + (1− λ)γ2(x, y). (120)
Claim 3: Given pmfs (µ, γ) with the same marginals, one can find a path (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xk, yk) (as
in Definition 9) such that γ(xi, yi) > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and µ(x1, yk) > 0 and µ(xi, yi−1) > 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
Consider a minimizer (µ, γ) and the path given in Claim 3 for (µ, γ). Define µ1(x, y) and γ1(x, y) as
follows:
γ1(x, y) =
{
1
k if (x, y) = (xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
0 otherwise,
(121)
µ1(x, y) =


1
k if (x, y)=(x1, yk),
1
k if (x, y)=(xi, yi−1) for 2≤ i≤k,
0 otherwise.
(122)
Observe that γ1 and µ1 have the same marginals and satisfy the conditions Support(µ1) ⊆ Support(µ)
and Support(γ1) ⊆ Support(γ). Using Claim 1 and 2, we conclude that (γ1, µ1) must also be a minimizer.
Using (116), we therefore obtain
ǫ˜1 =
∏
x,y
pXY (x, y)
−µ1(x,y)+γ1(x,y) (123)
which evaluates to the value assigned to the path (x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xk, yk) according to (29). Since ǫ1 is
the minimum assigned value of all possible paths, we obtain ǫ1 ≤ ǫ˜1.
To show that ǫ˜1 ≤ ǫ1, suppose that ǫ1 is obtained for the minimizer path (x
′
1, y
′
1, x
′
2, y
′
2, · · · , x
′
k, y
′
k).
We construct µ′1 and γ
′
1 for this path, similar to (121) and (122), and the value of this path is
ǫ1 =
∏
x,y
pXY (x, y)
−µ′
1
(x,y)+γ′
1
(x,y). (124)
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Using (116), we obtain ǫ˜1 ≤ ǫ1. This proves ǫ˜1 = ǫ1.
It remains to prove the claims given above.
Proof of Claim 1: The value of
∑
x,y(µi(x, y) − γi(x, y)) log pXY (x, y) must be less than or equal to∑
x,y(µ(x, y)− γ(x, y)) log pXY (x, y) for i = 1, 2 since (µ, γ) is a maximizer for (115). On the other hand,
by the linearity of (115), we have∑
x,y
(µ(x, y)− γ(x, y)) log pXY (x, y) = λ
∑
x,y
(µ1(x, y)− γ1(x, y)) log pXY (x, y)
+ (1− λ)
∑
x,y
(µ2(x, y)− γ2(x, y)) log pXY (x, y). (125)
We thus have, for i = 1, 2,∑
x,y
(µi(x, y)− γi(x, y)) log pXY (x, y) =
∑
x,y
(µ(x, y)− γ(x, y)) log pXY (x, y). (126)
Proof of Claim 2: Assign
λ=min

1, minx,y:
γ1(x,y)>0
γ(x, y)
γ1(x, y)
, min
x,y:
µ1(x,y)>0
µ(x, y)
µ1(x, y)

 . (127)
Observe that λ > 0 since γ1(x, y) > 0 implies that γ(x, y) > 0, and µ1(x, y) > 0 implies that µ(x, y) > 0.
Assigning the values
γ2(x, y) =
γ(x, y)− λγ1(x, y)
1− λ
(128)
µ2(x, y) =
µ(x, y)− λµ1(x, y)
1− λ
(129)
proves the claim.
Proof of Claim 3: Consider some x1 ∈ X such that γ(x1) > 0. Then there is some y1 ∈ Y such that
γ(x1, y1) > 0. Hence γ(y1) > 0, which implies that µ(y1) > 0. This also implies that there is some x2 ∈ X
such that µ(x2, y1) > 0. Hence, µ(x2) > 0 implies γ(x2) > 0 and that there is some y2 such that γ(x2, y2) >
0. We continue this process and obtain a sequence (x1, y1, x2, y2, ....). While applying the process, we
must observe at some point for the first time a previously occurred symbol. Suppose that this happens
at time m. If xm = xi for some i < m, then we consider the sequence (xi, yi, xi+1, yi+1, ..., xm−1, ym−1)
as our path. This is a desirable path since µ(xi, ym−1) = µ(xm, ym−1) > 0. Similarly, if ym = yi for
some i < m, we consider the sequence (xi+1, yi+1, ..., xm, ym) as our path. This is a desirable path since
µ(xi+1, ym) = µ(xi+1, yi) > 0. This proves the existence of such a path.
4.5 Proof of Theorem 6
Part 1: We first show that the one-way SK rate from Alice to Bob is positive if and only if
ǫ > 1− η(pY |X(y|x)) (130)
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where η(·) is as defined in (9).
The one-way SK rate is positive if and only if one can find auxiliary random variables U and V that
satisfy the Markov chain V U → X → Y Z such that
I(U ;Y |V ) > I(U ;Z|V ) =(1−ǫ)I(U ;XY |V )= (1− ǫ)I(U ;X|V ). (131)
Thus, the one-way SK rate is positive if and only if
ǫ > 1− sup
V U→X→Y
I(U ;Y |V )
I(U ;X|V )
(a)
= 1− η(pY |X(y|x)) (132)
where (a) follows by Lemma 3, proved in Appendix C.
Part 2: We next prove that L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if and only if
ǫ ≤ 1− max
qXY (x,y):
qXY (x,y)pXY (x,y)
ρ2m(qXY (x, y)). (133)
From the definition of L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0, one can deduce that L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if and only if, for any
U1, U2, · · · , Uk satisfying (12) and (13), any i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and any u1:i−1 such that P(U1:i−1 = u1:i−1) >
0, we have for odd and even i, respectively,
I(Ui;Y |U1:i−1=u1:i−1)−I(Ui;Z|U1:i−1=u1:i−1) ≤ 0 (134)
I(Ui;X|U1:i−1=u1:i−1)−I(Ui;Z|U1:i−1=u1:i−1) ≤ 0. (135)
The reason is that if either (134) or (135) fails, we can construct a valid Ui by setting it to a constant
conditioned on U1:i−1 6= u1:i−1 so that
I(Ui;Y |U1:i−1) = P(U1:i−1 = u1:i−1)I(Ui;Y |U1:i−1=u1:i−1).
We can then compute a non-zero lower bound L(X;Y ‖Z) by considering k = ζ = i in (14).
Equivalently, one can show that L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if and only if for any U1, U2, · · · , Uk satisfying (12)
and (13), any i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and any u1:i−1 such that P(U1:i−1 = u1:i−1) > 0, the one-way SK rates for
the distribution
rXY (x, y) = pXY |U1:i−1(x, y|u1:i−1)
are zero. This is because for any rUVXY (u, v, x, y) = rUV |X(u, v|x)rY |X(y|x) such that Ir(U ;Y |V ) −
Ir(U ;Z|V ) > 0, there exists some v such that Ir(U ;Y |V = v) − Ir(U ;Z|V = v) > 0. If i is odd, we can
then append to U1:i−1 the choices Ui = V and Ui+1 = U . Considering U1:i = (u1:i−1, v), we have
I(Ui+1;Y |U1:i=u1:i)−I(Ui+1;Z|U1:i=u1:i) > 0.
For even i, we can set Ui = constant, Ui+1 = V , and Ui+2 = U , and proceed similarly.
To complete the proof, we need to characterize the class of distributions rXY (x, y) that arises when
we condition the joint distribution of (X,Y ) on U1:i−1 = u1:i−1. The authors of [20, 21] consider this
problem, where they search for the set of conditional pmfs pXY |U1:k(x, y|u1:k) that one can obtain with
some auxiliary random variables U1, U2, · · · , Uk satisfying
Ui → XU1:i−1 → Y for odd i,
Ui → Y U1:i−1 → X for even i
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for some arbitrary k and arbitrary realization u1:k of U1:k satisfying P(U1:k = u1:k) > 0. This set of pmfs
can be expressed as qXY (x, y) = a(x)b(y)pXY (x, y) for some functions a : X → R and b : Y → R [20, 21],
i.e., qXY (x, y)  pXY (x, y). Combining this observation with (37) proves that L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if and only
if
ǫ ≤ 1− max
qXY (x,y):
qXY (x,y)pXY (x,y)
η(qY |X(y|x)) (136)
(a)
= 1− max
qXY (x,y):
qXY (x,y)pXY (x,y)
ρ2m(qXY (x, y)) (137)
where (a) follows by (9) and because if qXY (x, y)  pXY (x, y), then for any rXY (x, y) = rX(x)qY |X(y|x)
we also have rXY (x, y)  pXY (x, y). A similar argument is used in [21, Eq. (80)].
Part 3: Since pZ|XY (z|xy) is an erasure channel with probability ǫ, Lemma 4 in Appendix C shows that
a given conditional distribution pZ¯|X,Y (z¯|x, y) can be produced with a degradation pZ¯|Z(z¯|z) on random
variable Z, if and only if
ǫ ≤
∑
z¯
min
x,y:pX,Y (x,y)>0
pZ¯|X,Y (z¯|x, y). (138)
As a result, the intrinsic mutual information B0(X;Y ‖Z) in (16) is zero if and only if
ǫ ≤ sup
pZ¯|X,Y (z¯|x,y):I(X;Y |Z¯)=0
∑
z¯
min
x,y:pX,Y (x,y)>0
pZ¯|X,Y (z¯|x, y). (139)
In computing B0(X;Y ‖Z), it suffices to restrict to random variables Z¯ with cardinality at most |Z| [23].
Therefore, we assume that z¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |Z|}. Finally, observe that the condition I(X;Y |Z¯) = 0 is
equivalent to the condition that the matrix
[pXY (x, y)pZ¯|X,Y (z¯|x, y)]x,y
has rank one for all z¯.
Part 4: Consider a p(z¯|x, y) such that X → Z¯ → Y forms a Markov chain. Since Z is the result of XY
passing through an erasure channel, for any q(u, x, y)p(z|x, y) we have
I(U ;Z) = (1− ǫ)I(U ;XY ).
Thus, B1(X;Y ‖Z) in (17) is zero if and only if for any q(u, x, y)p(z¯|x, y) we have
(1 − ǫ)I(U ;XY ) ≥ I(U ; Z¯).
This can be expressed in terms the strong data processing constant and Renyi’s maximal correlation as
1− ǫ ≥ max
q(x,y)p(z¯|x,y)
s∗(q(xy, z¯)) = η(p(z¯|x, y)). (140)
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4.6 Proof of Theorem 7
Using Theorem 6, the one-way SK rate for a DSBE source is positive if
ǫ > 1− max
qXY (x,y):
qXY (x,y)=qX(x)pY |X(y|x)
ρ2m(qXY (x, y)).
In particular, the one-way SK rate for a DSBE source is positive if
ǫ > 1− ρ2m(pXY (x, y)) = 1− (1− 2p)
2 = 4p(1 − p).
We next prove that L¯(X;Y ‖Z) = 0 if ǫ ≤ 4p(1− p), which completes the proof of Theorem 7. Note that
the lower bound L¯(X;Y ‖Z) obtained from (14) includes the one-way SK rate. Using [21, Theorem 6], we
obtain
max
qXY (x,y):
qXY (x,y)pXY (x,y)
ρ2m(qXY (x, y)) = (1− 2p)
2. (141)
Combining (38) with (141) gives the desired result.
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A A New Interpretation of the Upper Bound B1(X; Y ‖Z)
In this section, we give a new interpretation of the upper bound B1(X;Y ‖Z). In [17], the bound
S(X;Y ‖Z) ≤ B1(X;Y ‖Z) follows by showing that
S(X;Y ‖Z) ≤ S(X;Y ‖J) + Sow(XY ;J‖Z)
= S(X;Y ‖J)+ max
V→U→XY→ZJ
I(U ;J |V )− I(U ;Z|V ) (142)
where Sow(XY ;J‖Z) is the one-way SK rate from XY to J . The interpretation of (142) given in [17] is
to split the key shared between X and Y (and hidden from Z) into two parts: a part independent of J
(i.e., the term S(X;Y ‖J)) and another part shared with J (i.e., the term Sow(XY ;J‖Z)).
We now give a new interpretation for (142). To do this, we begin by revisiting the intrinsic mutual
information upper boundB0(X;Y ‖Z). For this bound, note that making Eve weaker by passing Z through
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a channel pJ |Z(j|z) does not decrease the SK capacity. Thus, S(X;Y ‖Z) ≤ S(X;Y ‖J) if J → Z → XY
forms a Markov chain. We now replace the degradation of Z to J with the less noisy condition. Consider
a broadcast channel with input (X,Y ) and two outputs Z and J . We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If the channel pZ|XY (z|x, y) is less noisy than the channel pJ |XY (j|x, y), then
S(X;Y ‖Z) ≤ S(X;Y ‖J). (143)
Proof 1. The proposition follows from (142) since if Z is less noisy than J , then I(U ;J |V ) − I(U ;Z|V )
vanishes in (142). We give a direct proof of Proposition 1 below.
Proof 2. Suppose that we have a code for (Xn, Y n, Zn) with public communication F1, F2, · · · , Fk, and
keys KA and KB . We then have
1
n
I(KA;Z
nF1:k) ≤ ǫ.
We now show that
I(KA;J
nF1:k) ≤ I(KA;Z
nF1:k) (144)
which shows that the code is secure also for an eavesdropper that has i.i.d. repetitions of J instead of Z.
To prove (144), we need to show that
I(KA;J
n|F1:k) ≤ I(KA;Z
n|F1:k).
It therefore suffices to show for all f1:k that
I(KA;J
n|F1:k = f1:k) ≤ I(KA;Z
n|F1:k = f1:k). (145)
Since we have the Markov chain F1:kKA → X
nY n → ZnJn, when we condition on F1:k = f1:k, we also
have the Markov chain KA → X
nY n → ZnJn and
pZnJn|XnY nF1:k(z
n, jn|xn, yn, f1:k) = pZnJn|XnY n(zn, jn|xn, yn)
for all xn, yn, zn, jn, f1:k ∈ X
n×Yn×Zn×J n×F1:k. Since pZ|XY (z|x, y) is less noisy than pJ |XY (j|x, y),
the n-letter product channel pZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn) is also less noisy than the channel pJn|XnY n(jn|xn, yn).
Thus, we have the bound (145).
Proposition 1 gives the following interpretation of (142): the term Sow(XY ;J‖Z) is the penalty of
deviating from the less-noisy condition when we replace Z with J in S(X;Y ‖Z) and S(X;Y ‖J).
B A New Measure of Correlation
The quantity ǫ2 given in Definition 9 motivates a new measure of correlation. Suppose we are given a
joint probability distribution pXY (x, y). Let
qX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2) = pXY (x1, y1)pXY (x2, y2)
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rX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2) = pXY (x1, y2)pXY (x2, y1)
and define the new correlation measure
Jα(X;Y ) , Dα
(
qX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2)
∣∣∣∣rX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2)) (146)
where Dα is the Renyi divergence of order α. We have
J∞(X;Y ) = log maxx1,x2,y1,y2:
pX(x1),pX(x2),pY (y1),pY (y2)>0
(
pXY (x1, y1)pXY (x2, y2)
pXY (x1, y2)pXY (x2, y1)
)
= log max
x1 6=x2,y1 6=y2:
pX(x1),pX(x2),pY (y1),pY (y2)>0
(
pXY (x1, y1)pXY (x2, y2)
pXY (x1, y2)pXY (x2, y1)
)
= 2 log
1
ǫ2
. (147)
Some properties of Jα are as follows.
• Faithfulness: Jα(X;Y ) ≥ 0 with equality Jα(X;Y ) = 0 if and only if X and Y are independent.
Equality follows from qX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2) = rX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2) for all x1, x2, y1, y2.
• Data Processing : If A→ X → Y → B, then we have Jα(X;Y ) ≥ Jα(A;B). In particular, we have
Jα(X1X2;Y1Y2) ≥ Jα(X1;Y1).
To show that A→ X → Y → B implies Jα(X;Y ) ≥ Jα(A;B), consider some p(a|x) and p(b|y). Let
V (a1a2b1b2|x1x2y1y2) = p(a1|x1)p(a2|x2)p(b1|y1)p(b2|y2)
and define
qA1B1A2B2(a1, b1, a2, b2) =
∑
x1x2y1y2
qX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2)V (a1a2b1b2|x1x2y1y2)
= pAB(a1, b1)pAB(a2, b2) (148)
and
rA1B1A2B2(a1, b1, a2, b2) =
∑
x1x2y1y2
rX1Y1X2Y2(x1, y1, x2, y2)V (a1a2b1b2|x1x2y1y2)
= pAB(a1, b2)pAB(a2, b1). (149)
The bound Jα(X;Y ) ≥ Jα(A;B) follows from the data processing property of Dα.
• Symmetry : The definition (146) implies that
Jα(X;Y ) = Jα(Y ;X).
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• Additivity : If (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2) are independent, then
Jα(X1X2;Y1Y2) = Jα(X1;Y1) + Jα(X2;Y2)
which follows from (146).
Furthermore, J∞(X;Y ) has the following properties:
• By (147) we see that J∞(X;Y ) depends only on pY |X and the support set of the distribution on X.
Thus, with abuse of notation, we may write
J∞(pY |X(y|x),X ′) , J∞(X;Y ) (150)
where X ′ = {x : pX(x) > 0}.
• For a pmf pXY Z , let
J∞(X;Y |Z) , max
z:pZ(z)>0
J∞(X;Y |Z = z).
Then, if F −X − Y forms a Markov chain, we have
J∞(X;Y ) ≥ J∞(X;Y |F ).
An application of J∞ is given in the next subsection. As another application, consider a key agreement
protocol of blocklength n with public messages F1, F2, . . . , Fk to agree on single bits KA,KB ∈ {0, 1}.
Then we can write
nJ∞(X;Y |Z) = J∞(Xn;Y n|Zn)
≥ J∞(Xn;Y n|F1Zn)
≥ J∞(Xn;Y n|F1F2Zn)
. . .
≥ J∞(Xn;Y n|F1:kZn)
≥ J∞(KA;KB |F1:kZn)
≥ max
f1:k,zn
log
(
pKAKB|f1:k,zn(0, 0)pKAKB|f1:k,zn(1, 1)
pKAKB|f1:k,zn(0, 1)pKAKB|f1:k,zn(1, 0)
)
providing a bound on how fast Alice and Bob can approach the ideal distribution
qKAKBZnF1:k =
1
2
1[kA = kB ]pZnF1:k
as given in (23).
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B.1 An “Uncertainty Principle” for Channel Coding
Consider a point to point communication to send a message M over a channel pY |X(y|x) with n channel
uses. Then, the chain M → Xn → Y n → Mˆ is Markov so that the data-processing property of the new
correlation measure implies
J∞(M ; Mˆ ) ≤ J∞(Xn;Y n).
However, J∞(Xn;Y n) depends only on the channel p(yn|xn) and the support set of Xn, that is {xn :
p(xn) > 0}. Because increasing the support set can only increase J∞, we conclude that
J∞(Xn;Y n) ≤ J∞(p(yn|xn),X n) = n× J∞(p(y|x),X )
Thus, we have
J∞(M ; Mˆ) ≤ n× J∞(p(y|x),X )
which implies that for any m1 6= m2 we have
log
(
pMˆ |M(m1|m1)
pMˆ |M(m2|m1)
×
pMˆ |M (m2|m2)
pMˆ |M (m1|m2)
)
≤ n× J∞(p(y|x),X ). (151)
Equivalently, we have the following inequality
pMˆ |M (m2|m1)
pMˆ |M (m1|m1)
×
pMˆ |M(m1|m2)
pMˆ |M(m2|m2)
≥ exp (−n× J∞(p(y|x),X )) . (152)
Define
PMˆ |M (m2|m1)
PMˆ |M (m1|m1)
(153)
as the “uncertainty of M = m1” against M = m2 if the true value of M is m1. Similarly, define the
“uncertainty of M = m2” against M = m1 if the true value of M is m2 as
PMˆ |M (m1|m2)
PMˆ |M (m2|m2)
. (154)
Then (152) gives a lower bound on the product of the uncertainty of M = m1 and the uncertainty of
M = m2. (152) states that “if the uncertainty when the true value of M is m1 is very small, then the
uncertainty when the true value of M is m2 cannot be small.” This may be considered as an uncertainty
principle.
C Lemmas Used in the Proof of Theorem 6
Lemma 3. For any pX(x) such that pX(x) > 0 for all x, and any pY |X(y|x), we have
η
(
pY |X(y|x)
)
= sup
V U→X→Y
I(U ;Y |V )
I(U ;X|V )
.
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Proof. For any (U, V ) satisfying the Markov chain V U → X → Y , we have
I(U ;Y |V )
I(U ;X|V )
≤ max
v
I(U ;Y |V = v)
I(U ;X|V = v)
(a)
≤ s∗r(X;Y )
≤ max
qXY (x,y):
qXY (x,y)=qX(x)pY |X(y|x)
s∗q(X;Y )
= η
(
pY |X(y|x)
)
(155)
where (a) follows because s∗r(X;Y ) is the strong data processing constant evaluated according to
rXY (x, y) = pXY |V (x, y|v) = pX|V (x|v)pY |X(y|x).
Therefore, we have
η
(
pY |X(y|x)
)
≥ sup
V U→X→Y
I(U ;Y |V )
I(U ;X|V )
.
On the other hand, consider an arbitrary pV |X(v|x). Fix some v∗ such that PV (v∗) > 0 and let U be a
constant when V 6= v∗. Then we have
I(U ;Y |V )
I(U ;X|V )
=
I(U ;Y |V = v∗)
I(U ;X|V = v∗)
.
Thus, we obtain
sup
V U→X→Y
I(U ;Y |V )
I(U ;X|V )
≥ s∗(X;Y |V = v∗).
Since pX(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X , for any pmf qX(x) on X one can find a channel pV |X(v|x) and a value v∗
such that pX,Y |V (x, y|v∗) = qX(x)pY |X(y|x). Thus, we obtain
sup
V U→X→Y
I(U ;Y |V )
I(U ;X|V )
≥ max
qX(x)
s∗
(
qX(x)pY |X(y|x)
)
= η
(
pY |X(y|x)
)
. (156)
Lemma 4. Let A and R be arbitrary discrete sets. Let pA(a) be a probability distribution on A such that
pA(a) > 0 for all a ∈ A. Let B = A∪{e} and assume that pB|A(b|a) is an erasure channel with probability
ǫ (here e is the erasure symbol). Consider an arbitrary qR|A(r|a). There exists a conditional distribution
pR|B(r|b) such that ∑
b
pA,B(a, b)pR|B(r|b) = pA(a)qR|A(r|a) (157)
if and only if ∑
r
min
a
qR|A(r|a) ≥ ǫ. (158)
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Remark 5. The term
∑
rmina qR|A(r|a) is known as Doeblin’s coefficient of ergodicity of the channel
qR|A(r|a) [32, Section 5]. One direction of Lemma 4 is mentioned in [33] and [34, Remark 3.2]; the other
direction seems to be new.
Proof. Suppose that we have a conditional distribution pR|B(r|b) such that (157) holds. Since pB|A(b|a)
is an erasure channel, given an input A = a, B has two possibilities B ∈ {a, e}. We have
pA(a)qR|A(r|a) =
∑
b
pA,B(a, b)pR|B(r|b) (159)
= ǫpA(a)pR|B(r|e) + (1− ǫ)pA(a)pR|B(r|a) (160)
≥ ǫpA(a)pR|B(r|e). (161)
Thus, from pA(a) > 0 for all a ∈ A we have qR|A(r|a) ≥ ǫpR|B(r|e). We obtain
min
a
qR|A(r|a) ≥ ǫpR|B(r|e). (162)
Therefore, we observe that ∑
r
min
a
qR|A(r|a) ≥ ǫ
∑
r
pR|B(r|e) = ǫ (163)
which proves the correctness of (158).
Conversely, take some arbitrary qR|A(r|a) satisfying (158) and let qAR(a, r) = pA(a)qR|A(r|a). Then
for all r we have
qR(r) =
∑
a
pA(a)qR|A(r|a) > 0
and ∑
a
pA(a)
qR|A(r|a)
qR(r)
= 1.
Thus, we conclude that for any r we have
min
a
qR|A(r|a)
qR(r)
≤ 1.
Furthermore, using (158), we have
∑
r
qR(r)min
a
qR|A(r|a)
qR(r)
≥ ǫ. (164)
Thus, one can find λ(r) ∈ [0, 1] such that
λ(r) ≤ min
a
qR|A(r|a)
qR(r)
(165)
and
ǫ =
∑
r
qR(r)λ(r). (166)
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Define pR|B(r|b) as follows:
pR|B(r|e) =
qR(r)λ(r)
ǫ
(167)
pR|B(r|a) =
qR|A(r|a)− qR(r)λ(r)
1− ǫ
∀a ∈ A. (168)
The conditional probability in (167) is well defined by (166). The conditional probability in (168) is
non-negative and well-defined by (165). Finally, observe that with the choice of pR|B(r|b) in (167) and
(168), the marginal probability distribution of A,R is
pAR(a, r) =
∑
b
pA,B(a, b)pR|B(r|b)
= ǫpA(a)pR|B(r|e) + (1− ǫ)pA(a)pR|B(r|a)
= pA(a)qR(r)λ(r) + pA(a)
(
qR|A(r|a)− qR(r)λ(r)
)
= pA(a)qR|A(r|a) (169)
which proves the converse.
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